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Abstract
Two classes of distributions that are widely used in the analysis of Bayesian auctions are
the Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) and Regular distributions. They can both be characterized
in terms of the rate of change of the associated virtual value functions: for MHR distributions
the condition is that for values v < v′, φ(v′) − φ(v) ≥ v′ − v, and for regular distributions,
φ(v′) − φ(v) ≥ 0. Cole and Roughgarden introduced the interpolating class of α-Strongly
Regular distributions (α-SR distributions for short), for which φ(v′) − φ(v) ≥ α(v′ − v), for
0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
In this paper, we investigate five distinct auction settings for which good expected revenue
bounds are known when the bidders’ valuations are given by MHR distributions. In every
case, we show that these bounds degrade gracefully when extended to α-SR distributions. For
four of these settings, the auction mechanism requires knowledge of these distribution(s) (in
the other setting, the distributions are needed only to ensure good bounds on the expected
revenue). In these cases we also investigate what happens when the distributions are known
only approximately via samples, specifically how to modify the mechanisms so that they remain
effective and how the expected revenue depends on the number of samples.
1 Introduction
Much of the recent computer science research on revenue-maximizing auctions uses Bayesian anal-
ysis to measure auction performance (see [9] for an overview), although there is also a considerable
body of work on worst-case revenue maximization (see [10]). Typically the analyses seek to com-
pare the revenue for the given mechanism to a measure of the optimal revenue, expressing this as
an approximation factor.
In Bayesian analyses the bidders valuations are assumed to be drawn from one or more distri-
butions, either one common distribution for all the bidders, or separate distributions for distinct
groups of bidders, possibly with each bidder being in a distinct group. Almost all previous Bayesian
analyses have been for one of three settings: all distributions, regular distributions, and Monotone
Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions, with MHR being the more restrictive. For example, Myerson’s
analysis [14] of the expected revenue of the optimal auction for the sale of a single item is most
natural when the buyer values are given by regular value distributions (different buyers may have
values drawn from distinct distributions). Many other results, including those we will consider in
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this paper, are currently known only for MHR distributions, and for the most part do not extend
to regular distributions.
Recently, Cole and Roughgarden [6] introduced the notion of α-Strongly Regular distributions,
α-SR distributions for short; these interpolate between MHR and Regular distributions. They
gave two examples of settings for which results previously shown for MHR distributions extended
smoothly to α-SR distributions. However, the main focus of their work was to investigate what
happens in auctions, and in Myerson’s auction in particular, when distributions are known only
approximately, rather than exactly, and how to analyze the resulting expected revenue as a function
of the number of samples.
In independent work, Schweizer and Szech identified the same notion, which they term λ-
regularity, where λ corresponds to 1 − α [15]. They proved this is equivalent to ρ-concavity, an
earlier, albeit less intuitive characterization of this class of distributions.
In this paper we carry out a more thorough investigation of α-SR distributions, and specifically
to what extent known results for MHR distributions extend to α-SR distributions. We consider
five auction settings, listed in Table 1. For each problem, we show that the prior result extends
smoothly. In addition, for four of these problems, the auction uses knowledge of the distribution
in its decision making. For these two settings, we propose variants of the auctions which allow
efficiency in terms of revenue to be maintained, and we also determine how the expected revenue
varies as a function of the number of samples.
The technical challenges in this work were two-fold. First, we had to extend a variety of results
concerning properties of MHR distributions to α-SR distributions. While some of these results are
straightforward extensions of analogous results for MHR distributions, in other cases new proofs
were needed, as the previous arguments depended on convexity properties that need not hold
outside the MHR domain. For the most part, once these new results were obtained, analyzing the
auction revenue was simply a matter of replacing an MHR bound with the corresponding α-SR
bound, as illustrated in Section 3.
Second, in working with samples we had to adjust some of the mechanisms to take account of the
fact that they were using an approximation of the actual distributions. For example, for the result
in Theorem 9, we take the apparently optimal solution based on the approximate distributions, and
adjust it in a non-uniform manner; the resulting solution achieves an approximation factor similar
to what is obtained given exact distributions.
Schweizer and Szech in [15] also prove results concerning α-SR distributions. For the most part,
these results have a more structural flavor than the results in this paper. However, the main bound
in their Lemma 6 is the same as Lemma 5 in this paper, and the bound in their Proposition 4 is the
same as Lemma 9 in this paper (the proofs appear to be quite different, however). While they do
not delve into the specific bounds achieved in applications, they identify an essentially disjoint set
of applications to which the α-SR generalization of MHR bounds can be applied, including those
found in [1, 2, 5, 7, 11].
Finally, Schweizer and Szech develop a notion of λ∗-regularity, generalizing λ-regularity. This is
an alternative to hyper-regularity, a notion proposed by Kleinberg and Yuan [13], which had been
used to obtain revenue to welfare bounds in single parameter mechanisms.
In sum, this work strongly suggests that results that hold w.r.t. MHR distributions will often
degrade gracefully when extended to α-SR distributions. The one result we did not succeed in
extending was Theorem 3.14 in [8]. It would be interesting to know if there are problems for which
there is no graceful degradation. This work also suggests that the optimal mechanism given full
knowledge of the distributions may need non-trivial modifications to achieve good performance
when faced with sample-based empirical distributions.
Our results are shown in Table 1. Column 2 gives known results for MHR distributions expressed
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Mechanism MHR α-SR with samples
VCG for
3 [12] 2+αα (Thm. 1) n/adownward closed
revenue approx.
VCG-L mechanism
1
e [8] α
1/(1−α) (Thm. 2) result belowrevenue vs. VCG
welfare
k-bidders α1/(1−α) · 1−ξ(1+γ)2(1−kδ)
(1+γ)4
(Thm. 6)
Downward closed,
4(1 + e) [4] 4α + 2
α+1
α(2−α)/(1−α)
(Thm. 3)
result below
known budgets
social welfare approx.
4
α + 2
α+1
α(2−α)/(1−α)(1−ǫ)(1−nδ)
(Thm. 7)
Downward closed,
3(1 + e) [4] 3
(
1 + 1
α1/(1−α)
)
(Thm. 4) result below
private budgets,
single parameter
revenue approx.
k-bidders 31−kδ
(
1 + 1
α1/(1−α)(1−max{
√
8γ/α,4γ+ξ})
)
(Thm. 8)
Public budget,
192e2 [3] 192
α
(
2−α
α
)1/(1−α)
(Thm. 5) see Thm. 9universally IC
revenue approx.
Table 1: Results for the mechanisms we analyze.
as an approximation factor; Column 3 gives the corresponding results for α-SR distributions, and
Column 4, where applicable, the results under sampling of the distributions. δ, ξ, and γ are
parameters used to specify the number m of samples and which need to satisfy γξm ≥ 4, (1+γ)2 ≤
3/2, and m ≥ 6(1+γ)
γ2ξ
max{ ln 3γ , ln 3δ}. Reasonable choices are ξ = δ, δ = γ/k, and γ ≤ 1/5 as small
as needed to give the desired approximation factor (except for Theorem 7, where δ = γ/n). All
the sampling results assume there are k classes of bidders each with their own distribution, and n
bidders in total. Note that when α tends to 1, the limit values for all the bounds in column 3, are
the prior known bounds for MHR distributions.
Our goal with this work is two fold. First, we aim to show that results for MHR distributions
can often be extended to α-SR distributions. Second, by providing a tool-kit of results about α-SR
distributions we hope to encourage other authors to attempt to extend their MHR results to α-SR
distributions.
In Section 2 we review some standard definitions and results. In Section 3 we prove Theorems 1–
5 (the results in column 3 in Table 1). In Section 4 we explore what happens when the distributions
are known approximately via samples, proving Theorems 6–9 (the results in column 4).
2 Preliminaries
Recall that for a distribution F , the virtual valuation φ(v) is given by
φ(v) = v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
,
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where f is the derivative of F . Sometimes, we might define F on a discrete set {1, . . . , L}, for some
L, in which case we define the virtual valuation as
φ(v) = v − 1− F (v)
F (v) − F (v − 1) ,
where F (0) = 0. Unless otherwise stated, we will assume that F is a continuous distribution. It is
often useful to use the hazard rate, h(v) = f(v)/(1−F (v)) (or h(v) = (F (v)−F (v−1))/(1−F (v))
in the case of a discrete distribution); then φ(v) = v − 1/h(v). Note that f , F , and h are always
non-negative.
Given a value v, it can be useful to refer to the quantile, q(v) = 1− F (v). Additionally, we let
v(q) be the value at quantile q.
Also recall that the monopoly price is the least price r such that φ(r) ≥ 0.
The following definition of α-SR distributions was introduced in [6].
Definition 1. A distribution F is α-SR if for all x < y,
φ(y)− φ(x) ≥ α(y − x).
Note that monotone-hazard (MHR) rate distributions are 1-SR, and regular distributions are
0-SR. If F is a continuous distribution, then Definition 1 is equivalent to stating that dφdv ≥ α.
The following worst-case α-SR distributions, first given in [6], will be used to show that several
of our results are tight:
Fα(v) = 1−
(
1 +
1− α
α
v
)− 1
1−α
, fα(v) =
1
α
(
1 +
1− α
α
v
)− 2−α
1−α
.
These distributions have power-law tails with parameter c = 2 + α1−α , i.e. f
α(v) = θ(v−c) for
large v.
3 Approximation Algorithms for α-SR Distributions
The versions of all of Theorems 1– 5 for MHR distributions rely on various quantitative properties of
MHR distributions. The new results depend on generalizing these properties to α-SR distributions;
some of these extensions are quite non-trivial.
3.1 Revenue of VCG with Duplicates
Theorem 1 bounds the expected revenue of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) with duplicates as de-
scribed in [12]. Recall that the VCG mechanism chooses the feasible set of bidders with the maxi-
mum total value to be the winners, and charges each bidder appropriately. With duplicates, VCG
is run on the set of bidders, along with a single additional copy of each bidder, so that each bidder
and its copy have independent and identical distributions on their valuations, are interchangable,
and cannot both be part of the winning set of bidders. In Theorem 1, as α tends to 1, our bound
on the approximation factor tends to 3, the tight bound previously achieved for MHR distributions
in [12].
Theorem 1. Let 0 < α < 1. For every downward-closed environment with valuations drawn
independently from distributions that are α-SR, the expected revenue of VCG with duplicates is a(
2+α
α
)
-approximation to the expected revenue of the optimal mechanism without duplicates.
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Proof. Lemma 1 below replaces Lemma 4.1 in the proof of Theorem 4.2 in [12]. The rest of the
proof is unchanged.
Lemma 1. Let 0 < α < 1 and let F be an α-SR distribution, and φ be its virtual valuation function.
Then, for all t,
Ev1,v2∼F [max{v1, v2}|max{v1, v2} ≥ t] ≤(
2 + α
α
)
Ev1,v2∼F [max(φ(v1), φ(v2))|max{v1, v2} ≥ t].
In Lemma 5 below we prove Lemma 1 for the case t = 0, which it turns out is when the bound
is tightest, as we later show in concluding the proof of Lemma 1.
To prove Lemma 5 we will use the following structural properties of α-SR distributions F and
their density functions f .
1. A lower bound on f(q) (Lemma 2): for q ≤ q0 ≤ 1, f(q) ≥ f(q0)
(
q
q0
)2−α
.
2. The single crossing property (Lemma 3): if for some v0, F (v0) > F
α(v0), then F (v) ≥ Fα(v)
for all v ≥ v0, where Fα is a tight distribution: f(q) = f(1) · q2−α.
3. Lemma 4: α1+α
∫∞
0 (1− F (v))dv ≤
∫∞
0 (1− F (v))2dv.
Lemma 2. Let F be an α-SR distribution, and let f be the density function for v. Let q0 ∈ [0, 1].
Then for q ≤ q0,
f(q) ≥ f(q0)
(
q
q0
)2−α
.
Proof. Recall that φ(v) = v − q(v)/f(v) and dvdq = −1/f(v). Hence dφdq = −2f(v) +
q(v)
f(v)2
df
dq . The
condition dφdv ≥ α yields dφdq = dφdv dvdq ≤ −αf(v) . Thus
q(v)
f(v)2
df
dq ≤ 2−αf(v) or ddq ln f ≤ 1q (2 − α). For q ≤ q0,
this yields f(q) ≥ f(q0)
(
q
q0
)2−α
as desired.
Lemma 3. Let F be an α-SR distribution, and let Fα be an α-SR distribution such that f(q) =
f(q0)
(
q
q0
)2−α
for all q0 ∈ [0, 1] and q ≤ q0. If for some v0, F (v0) > Fα(v0), then F (v) ≥ Fα(v)
for all v ≥ v0.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that the statement of the lemma does not hold. In particular,
assume that there are v2 and v4 with v4 > v2, F (v2) > F
α(v2), but F (v4) < F
α(v4). Then there
must exist v3, with v2 < v3 < v4, such that the function F (v) − Fα(v) crosses the x-axis from
above at v = v3. It follows that f(v3) − fα(v3) < 0, where f and fα are the density functions, or
derivatives, of F and Fα respectively.
Suppose that the function F (v) − Fα(v) crosses the x-axis from below at v1 < v2. If no such
v1 exists, let v1 = 0. Then it follows that f(v1)− fα(v1) ≥ 0. This is true even if v1 = 0, as in this
case, for all v in the interval [v1, v2], F (v) − Fα(v) ≥ 0.
Let q(v) be the quantile of v in F , and let qα(v) be the quantile of v in Fα. Note that
q(v1) = q
α(v1) and q(v3) = q
α(v3). By Lemma 2, for all v ≥ v1,
f(v) ≥ f(v1)
(
q(v)
q(v1)
)2−α
.
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Because f(v1) ≥ fα(v1) and q(v1) = qα(v1), the above is bounded below by
fα(v1)
(
q(v)
qα(v1)
)2−α
.
On setting v = v3, as q(v3) = q
α(v3), we obtain the bound
f(v3) ≥ fα(v1)
(
qα(v3)
qα(v1)
)2−α
.
However, the right-hand side is equal to fα(v3), which contradicts the statement that f(v3) −
fα(v3) < 0.
Lemma 4. Let 0 < α < 1 and let F be an α-SR distribution. Then
α
1 + α
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (v))dv ≤
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (v))2dv.
Proof. We start by defining the distribution G by rescaling F ’s argument so that
∫∞
0 (1−G(v))dv =
1. Let
G(v) = F
(
v ·
(∫ ∞
0
(1− F (w))dw
)−1)
= F (v · λ)
where λ =
(∫∞
0 (1− F (w))dw
)−1
. Note that
∫∞
0 (1 − G(v))dv =
∫∞
0 (1 − F (λv))dv =
∫∞
0 (1 −
F (w))λdw = 1. As G is obtained by rescaling F ’s argument, it is easy to see that G is also α-SR,
and that ∫∞
0 (1−G(v))dv∫∞
0 (1−G(v))2dv
=
∫∞
0 (1− F (v))dv∫∞
0 (1− F (v))2dv
.
Therefore proving the lemma for G implies the lemma for F .
Let Gα be defined analogously with respect to the worst case distribution Fα. A straightforward
calculation shows that the distribution Gα satisfies the inequality in the lemma. Therefore it is
enough to prove that ∫∞
0 (1−G(v))dv∫∞
0 (1−G(v))2dv
≤
∫∞
0 (1−Gα(v))dv∫∞
0 (1−Gα(v))2dv
. (1)
As both G and Gα are normalized so that
∫∞
0 (1 − G(v))dv =
∫∞
0 (1 − Gα(v))dv = 1, we can
show (1), and consequently the lemma, by showing that∫ ∞
0
(1−G(v))2dv ≥
∫ ∞
0
(1−Gα(v))2dv,
i.e. that ∫ ∞
0
(1−G(v))2dv −
∫ ∞
0
(1−Gα(v))2dv ≥ 0
or equivalently that∫ ∞
0
[(1−G(v)) − (1−Gα(v))] · [(1 −G(v)) + (1−Gα(v))]dv ≥ 0.
We apply Lemma 3 to G and Gα. Because Gα is the normalized version of the worst case
distribution, the conditions of Lemma 3 hold. It follows that there exists a v0 such that G(v) ≥
Gα(v) when v ≥ v0, and G(v) ≤ Gα(v) when v < v0. (Possibly v0 =∞.)
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Both 1−G and 1−Gα are decreasing functions and hence so is (1−G) + (1−Gα). Thus,∫ ∞
0
[(1−G(v)) − (1−Gα(v))] · [(1−G(v)) + (1−Gα(v))]dv
=
∫ ∞
v0
[(1 −G(v)) − (1−Gα(v))] · [(1−G(v)) + (1−Gα(v))]dv
+
∫ v0
0
[(1−G(v)) − (1−Gα(v))] · [(1−G(v)) + (1−Gα(v))]dv
≥[(1−G(v0)) + (1−Gα(v0))]
∫ ∞
v0
[(1 −G(v)) − (1−Gα(v))]dv
as (1−G(v)) − (1−Gα(v)) ≤ 0 when v ≥ v0
+ [(1−G(v0)) + (1−Gα(v0))]
∫ v0
0
[(1−G(v)) − (1−Gα(v))]dv
as (1−G(v)) − (1−Gα(v)) ≥ 0 when v < v0
= [(1−G(v0)) + (1−Gα(v0))]
∫ ∞
0
[(1−G(v)) − (1−Gα(v))]dv
= 0 as
∫∞
0 [(1 −G(v)) − (1−Gα(v))] = 0.
Lemma 5. Let 0 < α < 1 and let F be an α-SR distribution. Then,
Ev1,v2∼F [max{v1, v2}] ≤
(
2 + α
α
)
Ev1,v2∼F [min{v1, v2}]
=
(
2 + α
α
)
Ev1,v2∼F [max{φ(v1), φ(v2)}].
Proof. We first note that the equality follows by Myerson’s Lemma [14]. We now prove the in-
equality. Note that Pr[max{v1, v2} ≥ x] = 1− F (x)F (x). Then
Ev1,v2∼F [max{v1, v2}] =
∫ ∞
0
x
d
dx
[F (x)2]dx
=
∫ ∞
0
1− F (x)F (x)dx (on integrating by parts).
Similarly, Pr[min{v1, v2} ≥ x] = (1− F (x))(1 − F (x)). Thus
Ev1,v2∼F [min{v1, v2}] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))(1 − F (x))dx.
Therefore,
Ev1,v2∼F [max{v1, v2}]
Ev1,v2∼F [min{v1, v2}]
=
∫∞
0 1− F (x)F (x)dx∫∞
0 (1− F (x))(1 − F (x))dx
=∫∞
0 2(1− F (x))− (1− F (x))2dx∫∞
0 (1− F (x))2dx
=
2
∫∞
0 (1− F (x))dx∫∞
0 (1− F (x))2dx
− 1.
By applying Lemma 4, we see this is bounded above by(
2(1 + α)
α
− 1
)
=
2 + α
α
as desired.
7
Proof of Lemma 1. By Lemma 5, Lemma 1 holds when t = 0. We now prove the result for t > 0.
Let C(α) =
(
2+α
α
)
, and note that as F is regular, φ is increasing, and hence max(φ(v1), φ(v2)) =
φ(max{v1, v2}). Then, by substituting max{v1, v2} − 1h(max{v1,v2} for φ(max{v1, v2}) in the state-
ment of Lemma 1, we see that it is equivalent to
Ev1,v2∼F
[
(C(α)− 1)max{v1, v2} − C(α)
h(max{v1, v2})
∣∣∣∣ max{v1, v2} ≥ t] ≥ 0.
We rewrite this as
C(α) · Ev1,v2∼F
[
(1− α)max{v1, v2} − 1
h(max{v1, v2})+(
α− 1
C(α)
)
max{v1, v2}
∣∣∣∣ max{v1, v2} ≥ t] ≥ 0.
As dφdv ≥ α, d(φ−αv)dv ≥ 0, and consequently, (1− α)max{v1, v2} − 1h(max{v1,v2}) is always non-
decreasing as a function of max{v1, v2}. Additionally, we note that 1/C(α) ≤ α. Therefore,
conditioning on the event that max{v1, v2} ≥ t only increases the expected value.
3.2 Revenue of the VCG-L Mechanism
The VCG-L mechanism, as defined in [8], is used in settings in which each bidder has an attribute
(a classification) and for each attribute there is a corresponding known distribution from which
the bidder’s valuation is drawn. The VCG-L mechanism uses the reserve prices, one per bidder,
as defined in Section 2, as follows. First, the VCG mechanism is run. Second, all bidders whose
valuation is less than their reserve price are removed. Finally, each winning bidder is charged the
larger of its reserve price and its VCG payment from the first step.
In [8] the expected revenue of the VCG-L mechanism on MHR distributions was shown to
achieve a 1/e approximation of the welfare, or efficiency, of the VCG mechanism, which is tight.
In Theorem 2 we extend the analysis to α-distributions; the bound is again tight, as shown by the
case of a single bidder drawn from the worst-case distribution Fα. We note that the mechanism
does not achieve a constant factor approximation in the case of regular distributions [8].
Theorem 2. For every downward-closed environment with valuations drawn independently from
α-SR distributions where 0 < α < 1, the expected revenue of the VCG-L mechanism with monopoly
reserves is at least an α1/(1−α) fraction of the expected efficiency of the VCG mechanism.
Proof. Lemma 9 below replaces Lemma 3.10 in the proof of Theorem 3.11 in [8]. The rest of the
proof is unchanged.
The proof of Lemma 9 uses the fact that (α+1)/α ≤ α−1/(1−α), shown in Lemma 6, and lower
and upper bounds on the hazard rate h(v), given in Lemmas 7 and 8, respectively.
Lemma 6. For 0 < α < 1, (α+ 1)/α ≤ α−1/(1−α).
Proof. By rearranging the terms, we see that proving the lemma is equivalent to proving that
(α+ 1)1−α ≤ (1/α)α. We replace α with 1/x, and therefore it is enough to prove that for x > 1,(
1
x
+ 1
)1−1/x
≤ x1/x.
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Again, by rearranging terms, it is enough to show that(
x+ 1
x
)x
=
(
1 +
1
x
)x
≤ 1 + x.
The left-hand side is at most e, and therefore the inequality is true when x ≥ e− 1.
When x < e − 1, using the power series expansion for the left-hand side, we can bound it by
1 + 1 + (x− 1)/(2x) = 5/2− 1/(2x). The right-hand side is bounded above by 1 + x if and only if
3x− 1 ≤ 2x2, which holds when x > 1, as desired.
In the proof of Lemma 9, and other lemmas, we often refer to the cumulative hazard rate,
H(v) =
∫ v
0 h(x)dx. We can relate F andH by the following identity, which follows by differentiating
ln(1− F (v)).
1− F (v) = e−H(v). (2)
The following lemma gives a lower bound on h(v) which will be used in Lemma 9.
Lemma 7. Let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and let F be an α-SR distribution with virtual valuation function φ.
Then for all v1 ≤ v2,
1
(1− α)(v2 − v1) + 1/h(v1) ≤ h(v2).
Proof. When α = 1, this states that h(v2) ≥ h(v1) (for φ(v2)−φ(v1) = v2−1/h(v2)−(v1−1/h(v1)) ≥
v2 − v1 in this case).
By definition, as φ is α-SR, φ(v2)− φ(v1) ≥ α(v2 − v1). Substituting φ(v) = v − 1/h(v) yields(
v2 − 1
h(v2)
)
−
(
v1 − 1
h(v1)
)
≥ α(v2 − v1)
i.e.
(1− α)(v2 − v1) + 1
h(v1)
≥ 1
h(v2)
,
from which the desired inequality follows.
Using almost the same proof as above, we obtain the following upper bound on h(v), also used
in Lemma 9. This result was also shown in [6] for the special case of v2 = r.
Lemma 8. Let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and let F be an α-SR distribution with virtual valuation function φ.
Then for all v1 ≤ v2 such that 1/h(v2)− (1− α)(v2 − v1) > 0,
h(v1) ≤ 1
1/h(v2)− (1− α)(v2 − v1) .
Proof. Again, when α = 1, this states that h(v1) ≤ h(v2).
As in the proof of Lemma 7,
1
h(v1)
≥ 1
h(v2)
− (1− α)(v2 − v1).
If 1/h(v2) − (1 − α)(v2 − v1) > 0, then taking the reciprocal of both sides yields the desired
inequality.
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Note that for continuous distributions, the condition 1/h(v2)− (1−α)(v2− v1) > 0 holds when
v2 = r, where r is the reserve price, as 1/h(r) = r. Also note that Lemmas 7 and 8 hold in the case
that F is defined on a discrete set.
We now state and prove Lemma 9.
Lemma 9. Let 0 < α < 1 and let F be an α-SR distribution, with monopoly price r and revenue
function Rˆ. Let V (t) denote the expected welfare of a single-item auction with a posted price of t
and a single bidder with valuation drawn from F . For every non-negative number t ≥ 0,
Rˆ(max{t, r}) ≥ α1/(1−α)V (t).
Proof. As in the proof in [8] of the corresponding lemma for MHR distributions, we split this into
two cases, t ≤ r and t ≥ r. In both cases, we can write the left-hand side as s·(1−F (s)) = s·e−H(s),
where H(v) =
∫ v
0 h(v), and s = max{t, r}.
Case 1: t ≤ r.
We start from the fact that V (t) ≤
∫ ∞
0
e−H(v)dv, (3)
as shown in Lemma 3.10 in [8] if h is non-negative, which therefore still applies for the case of α-SR
distributions.
In order to upper bound V (t), we start by lower bounding H(v). Because h(v) is always non-
negative, H(v) is always non-negative. When v ≤ r, this will be the only lower bound we use.
Otherwise, we lower bound H(v) using the lower bound for h(v) from Lemma 7 when v ≥ r. In
particular, if v ≥ r, then
H(v) =
∫ v
0
h(v)dv =
∫ r
0
h(v)dv +
∫ v
r
h(v)dv = H(r) +
∫ v
r
h(v)dv
≥ H(r) +
∫ v
r
1
(1− α)(v − r) + rdv (by Lemma 7)
= H(r) +
1
1− α ln ((1− α)v + αr)
∣∣∣∣v
r
= H(r) +
1
1− α ln
(
(1− α)v
r
+ α)
)
.
Therefore,
V (t) ≤
∫ ∞
0
e−H(v)dv =
∫ r
0
e−H(v)dv +
∫ ∞
r
e−H(v)dv
≤
∫ r
0
e−H(v)dv + e−H(r)
∫ ∞
r
e−
1
1−α
ln((1−α) v
r
+α))dv
=
∫ r
0
e−H(v)dv + e−H(r)
∫ ∞
r
[(1− α)v
r
+ α]−1/(1−α)dv
=
∫ r
0
e−H(v)dv − e−H(r) 1− α
α
· r
1− α ·
(
1− α
r
v + α
)−α/(1−α)∣∣∣∣∣
∞
r
=
∫ r
0
e−H(v)dv − e−H(r) r
α
(
1− α
r
v + α
)−α/(1−α)∣∣∣∣∣
∞
r
=
∫ r
0
e−H(v)dv + e−H(r)
r
α
(4)
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We rewrite this as
(
eH(r)
∫ r
0
e−H(v)dv +
r
α
)
e−H(r).
In order to upper bound this, we consider eH(r)
∫ r
0 e
−H(v)dv by itself. Note that if v ≤ r, on applying
Lemma 8 with v1 = v and v2 = r,
h(v) ≤ 1
r − (1− α)(r − v) =
1
(1− α)v + αr .
It follows that H(r)−H(v) =
∫ r
v
h(v)dv ≤
∫ r
v
1
(1− α)v + αrdv
=
1
1− α ln ((1− α)v + αr)
∣∣∣∣r
v
=
1
1− α ln
(
r
(1− α)v + αr
)
.
Therefore, eH(r)
∫ r
0
e−H(v)dv ≤
∫ r
0
e
1
1−α
ln
(
r
(1−α)v+αr
)
dv
=
∫ r
0
(
(1− α)v
r
+ α
)−1/(1−α)
dv
= − r
α
(
1− α
r
v + α
)−α/(1−α)∣∣∣∣∣
r
0
=
r
α
(
α−α/(1−α) − 1
)
.
Plugging this into our bound for V (t) yields
V (t) ≤
( r
α
(
α−α/(1−α) − 1
)
+
r
α
)
e−H(r)
= α−1/(1−α) · r · e−H(r)
= Rˆ(r)α−1/(1−α), (as Rˆ(r) = re−H(r) by (2))
and as max{t, r} = r in this case, Rˆ(max{t, r}) ≥ α1/(1−α)V (t) as desired.
Case 2: t ≥ r.
From the proof of Lemma 3.10 in [8],
V (t) = e−H(t) ·
[
t+
∫ ∞
t
e−(H(v)−H(t))dv
]
.
For v ≥ t, H(v)−H(t) =
∫ v
t
h(v)dv ≥
∫ v
t
1
(1− α)(v − r) + rdv
(by Lemma 7 with v2 = v, v1 = r)
=
1
1− α ln ((1− α)v + αr)
∣∣∣∣v
t
=
1
1− α ln
(
(1− α)v + αr
(1− α)t+ αr
)
.
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Therefore,∫ ∞
t
e−(H(v)−H(t))dv ≤
∫ ∞
t
e
−1
1−α
ln
(
(1−α)v+αr
(1−α)t+αr
)
dv
=
∫ ∞
t
(
(1− α)v + αr
(1 − α)t+ αr
)−1/(1−α)
dv
=
−(1− α)
α
· (1− α)t+ αr
1− α ·
(
(1− α)v + αr
(1− α)t+ αr
)−α/(1−α)∣∣∣∣∣
∞
t
=
(1− α)t+ αr
α
≤ t
α
. (5)
It follows that V (t) = e−H(t) ·
[
t+
∫ ∞
t
e−(H(v)−H(t))dv
]
≤ e−H(t) ·
[
t+
t
α
]
= e−H(t) · t ·
(
α+ 1
α
)
(6)
≤ e−H(t) · t · α−1/(1−α) (by Lemma 6)
= Rˆ(t)α−1/(1−α).
3.3 Single-item Auctions with Known Budgets
Theorem 3 describes a mechanism that achieves a constant-factor approximation to the social
welfare, with the constraint that all bidders have a budget that is known. As α tends to 1, the
approximation factor tends to that given originally in [4]. However, it is not known if the given
mechanism is optimal, even for MHR distributions.
First, we generalize Lemma 3.1 in [12] from the case α = 1, which was also used to prove the
original theorem in [4]. It upper bounds values v in terms of the monopoly price r and the virtual
valuation φ(α).
Lemma 10. Let α ≥ 0 and let F be an α-SR distribution with monopoly price r and virtual
valuation function φ. Then, if v ≥ r,
v ≤ r + φ(v)
α
.
Proof. By definition, as φ is α-SR, φ(v) − φ(r) ≥ α(v − r). Because r is the monopoly price,
φ(r) ≥ 0; thus φ(v) ≥ α(v − r). Solving for v gives the above inequality.
Theorem 3. Let 0 < α < 1. For every downward-closed environment with valuations drawn inde-
pendently from distributions that are α-SR, and with budgets Bi for each bidder i, the mechanism
that chooses each of the following two mechanisms with probability one half gives a 4α+2
α+1
α(2−α)/(1−α)
-
approximation to the social welfare of a welfare-optimal budget-feasible mechanism. The resulting
mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational, and budget fea-
sible.
• Mechanism 1: Always allocate to the set S∗1 and charge zero payments, where S∗1 = argmax
∑
i∈S v
∗
i
and v∗i is the reserve price for the ith bidder.
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• Mechanism 2: Elicit values from the agents; for all i with vi > Bi, replace vi with Bi; run
Myerson’s mechanism on the resulting instance.
Proof. We start by upper-bounding the social welfare of any allocation x. First note that Lemma 10
implies that vi ≤ v∗i + φ(vi)/α+ φ−(vi)/α for all vi where φ−(vi) is equal to −φ(vi) if vi ≤ v∗i , and
0 otherwise. Additionally, by Lemma 20 in [4],
∫
φ−(vi)x(vi)dF (vi) ≤
∫
v∗i x(vi)dF (vi). Combining
these yields∫
v
(∑
i
vixi(v)
)
dF (v) ≤
∫
v
(∑
i
(
φi(vi)
α
+
(
1 +
1
α
)
v∗i
)
xi(v)
)
dF (v)
=
1
α
∫
v
(∑
i
(φi(vi)) xi(v)
)
dF (v) +
(
α+ 1
α
)∫
v
(∑
i
(v∗i ) xi(v)
)
dF (v) (7)
as an upper bound on the social welfare.
We now lower bound the social welfare of the two mechanisms. The social welfare of Mech-
anism 1 can be lower bounded by
∑
i∈S∗ E[vi] ≥
∑
i∈S∗(1 − F (v∗i ))v∗i ≥ α1/(1−α)
∑
i∈S∗ v
∗
i ≥
α1/(1−α)
∫
v
∑
i v
∗
i x(v)dF (v). The second inequality follows from Lemma 11 below. By Theorem
7 in [4], Mechanism 2 achieves social welfare at least 12
∫
v
∑
i φi(vi)x(v)dF (v).
Let W1 be the social welfare of Mechanism 1 and W2 the social welfare of Mechanism 2. Then
we can upper-bound (7) by
2
α
W2 +
(α+ 1)
α1+1/(1−α)
W1 =
2
α
W2 +
(α+ 1)
α(2−α)/(1−α)
W1. (8)
Let Mechanism i be the mechanism with the greater social welfare. Therefore, (8) is bounded above
by (
2
α
+
(α+ 1)
α(2−α)/(1−α)
)
Wi.
Finally, the mechanism stated in the lemma achieves social welfare at least Wi/2, which yields the
desired approximation factor.
3.4 Single-item Auctions with Private Budgets
The following theorem describes a mechanism that achieves a constant-factor approximation to the
revenue, with the constraint that all bidders have a budget that is unknown. As α tends to 1, the
approximation factor tends to that given originally in [4]. However, it is not known if the given
mechanism is optimal, even for MHR distributions.
Theorem 4. Let 0 < α < 1. For every downward-closed, single-parameter environment with
valuations drawn independently from distributions that are α-SR, and with private budgets Bi drawn
from a known distribution for each bidder i, there exists a mechanism, given in [4], that gives a
3
(
1 + α
−1/(1−α)
)
-approximation to the optimal revenue.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 14 in [4], substitute the bound from Lemma 11 below; it lower
bounds the probability that a valuation exceeds the monopoly price.
Lemma 11. [6] Let F be an α-SR distribution with monopoly price r. If 0 < α < 1, then
1− F (r) ≥ α1/(1−α).
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3.5 Multi-item auctions with Public Budgets
Finally, we consider a setting with discrete valuations, drawn from the set {1, . . . , L}, and with
public budgets, as defined in [3]. In Theorem 5, we show that the mechanism in [3] achieves a
192
α
(
2−α
α
)1/(1−α)
-approximation, which matches the bound given in [3] as α tends to 1.
Theorem 5. Let 0 < α < 1. Consider the setting with multiple bidders and items where each
bidder i has a public budget Bi, and the valuation of each item by each bidder is drawn independently
from an α-SR distribution. Then there exists a mechanism that is universally truthful dominant-
strategy incentive-compatible, and gives a 192α
(
2−α
α
)1/(1−α)
-approximation to the revenue of the
optimal truthful-in-expectation Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism.
Proof. Lemma 12 below replaces Lemma 13 in the analysis in [3].
Lemma 12. Let 0 < α < 1 and let F be an α-SR distribution defined on the set {1, . . . , L} with
monopoly price r and virtual valuation function φ. Then
Pr
v∼F
[φ(v) > αv/2] ≥
(
α
2− α
)1/(1−α)
.
Proof. As in [3], we construct a probability distribution with support [0, L] that approximates F .
In particular, let Fˆ be such that
F (v)− F (v − 1) =
∫ v
v−1
fˆ(v)dv
for all integers v, where Fˆ is the cumulative distribution function of fˆ . Such a distribution can be
constructed by letting fˆ(v) = F (⌈v⌉) − F (⌈v⌉ − 1). Let hˆ be the hazard rate of Fˆ .
It was shown in [3] that
∫ r
r−1 hˆ(v)dv ≤ h(r) for integers r ∈ {1, . . . , L}, and therefore that∫ r
0
hˆ(v)dv ≤
r∑
v=1
h(v).
Let k∗ be the integer such that φ(v) ≥ αv/2 if and only if v > k∗. Then k∗ − 1/h(k∗) ≤ αk∗/2
which on rearranging yields 1/h(k∗) ≥ ((2 − α)k∗)/2 and,
1/h(k∗)− (1− α)(k∗ − v) ≥ (2− α)k∗/2− (1− α)(k∗ − v)
=
α
2
k∗ + (1− α)v ≥ 0.
Therefore the condition in Lemma 8 holds. This implies that for all v ≤ k∗,
h(v) ≤ 1
(1− α)(v − k∗) + (2− α)k∗/2 ,
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and thus
k∗∑
i=1
h(v) ≤
k∗∑
i=1
1
(1− α)(v − k∗) + (2− α)k∗/2
≤
∫ k∗
0
1
(1− α)(v − k∗) + (2− α)k∗/2dv
=
1
1− α log((1− α)(v − k
∗) + (2− α)k∗/2)
∣∣∣∣k∗
0
=
1
1− α log
(
(2− α)k∗/2
(2− α)k∗/2 − (1− α)k∗
)
=
1
1− α log
(
2− α
α
)
.
where the second inequality uses the fact that 1(1−α)(v−k∗)+(2−α)k∗/2 is decreasing.
Finally, as in the proof of Lemma 3.3 in [3],
Pr
v∼F
[φ(v) > αv/2] = e−
∫ k∗
0 hˆ(v)dv ≥ e −11−α log( 2−αα )
=
(
2− α
α
)−1/(1−α)
as desired.
4 Sample Complexity
Here we discuss the sample complexity of the mechanisms used in Theorems 6–9. These mechanisms
require knowledge of the distributions from which the valuations are drawn. We will show how to
modify these mechanisms when the distributions are known approximately via samples.
In [6], this was done for the single-item auction by modifying the Myerson Auction. Our
mechanisms will follow the same format. After obtaining the samples, we estimate the distributions,
and use these in place of the actual distribution. In particular, given m samples, we first discard
the ⌊ξm⌋ − 1 largest samples. We let the empirical quantile of the jth largest sample vj be
q(vj) = 1− F (vj) = 2j−12m and we let the empirical revenue curve be defined as R
(
2j−1
2m
)
= 2j−12m vj ,
R(0) = R(1) = 0, with straight lines joining successive points. Because we will need to associate
an empirical quantile with each value smaller than the (⌊ξm⌋ − 1)th sample, we use the empirical
revenue curve to define these quantiles, as follows. We define v(q) · q = R(q), and q(v) = v−1(v).
We let CR be the convex hull of the actual revenue curve (which is convex for regular distribu-
tions). Also, we let CR be the convex hull of the empirical revenue curve, φ the empirical virtual
valuation function (i.e. the slope of CR), and r the empirical reserve price, i.e. the largest value such
that φ(r) = 0. We will be overloading notation, writing both CR(q) and CR(v(q)), and likewise for
CR.
We start by stating results about the empirical revenue curve that will be used to modify
mechanisms for the empirical setting. The following is Lemma 6.2 from [6] and gives a lower bound
on the accuracy of samples.
15
Lemma 13. Let F be a regular distribution (not necessarily strongly regular). Suppose m indepen-
dent samples with values v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vm are drawn from F . Let 0 < γ, ξ < 1 be given. Then
for all v ≤ v⌊ξm⌋
q(v) ∈ [q(v)/(1 + γ)2, q(v)(1 + γ)2] (9)
with probability at least 1− δ, if γξm ≥ 4, (1 + γ)2 ≤ 32 , and m ≥ 3γ2(1+γ)ξ max{ ln 3γ , ln 3δ}.
We use Lemma 13 to prove the following result which shows that the value of the revenue curve
at the empirical reserve price is a good approximation to the revenue at the actual reserve price.
Let Eα be the event that outcome (9) occurs for all v ≤ v⌊ξm⌋. Note that Eα holds with probability
at least 1− δ. Let ξ be the empirical quantile of the largest retained sample: ξ = ⌊2ξm⌋−12m ≥ ξ− 1m .
Recall that v(ξ) denotes the value of this sample, and q(v(ξ)) = ξ, of course.
Lemma 14. Conditioned on Eα,
CR(r) ≥ 1− ξ(1 + γ)
2
(1 + γ)4
CR(r).
Proof. We assume that the statement in Lemma 13 holds, which it does with probability 1− δ. By
Lemma 13,
CR(r) = q(r)r ≥ 1
(1 + γ)2
q(r)r =
1
(1 + γ)2
CR(r). (10)
At this point we consider two cases, q(r) ≥ ξ and q(r) < ξ.
Case 1: q(r) ≥ ξ.
By the definition of r, CR(r) ≥ CR(r) and therefore (10) is bounded below by 1(1+γ)2CR(r).
We use Lemma 13 again to see that
1
(1 + γ)2
CR(r) =
1
(1 + γ)2
q(r)r ≥ 1
(1 + γ)4
q(r)r =
1
(1 + γ)4
CR(r).
Case 2: q(r) < ξ.
By the definition of r, CR(r) ≥ CR(q(v(ξ))) and therefore (10) is bounded below by 1
(1+γ)2
CR(q(v(ξ))).
We use Lemma 13 again to see that
1
(1 + γ)2
CR(q(v(ξ))) =
1
(1 + γ)2
q(v(ξ))v(ξ) ≥ 1
(1 + γ)4
q(v(ξ))v(ξ) =
1
(1 + γ)4
CR(v(ξ)).
Because CR is convex and by assumption v(ξ) < r, it follows that
1
(1 + γ)4
CR(v(ξ)) ≥ 1− q(v(ξ))
(1 + γ)4
CR(r).
Finally, by Lemma 13, q(v(ξ)) ≤ q(v(ξ))(1+γ)2 and therefore we obtain a final bound of 1−ξ(1+γ)2
(1+γ)4
CR(r)
as desired.
The following lemma from [6] describes the accuracy of the empirical revenue curves.
Lemma 15. Assume that Eα holds. Then for all empirical quantiles q(r) ≥ q ≥ ξ,
1
(1 + γ)3
CR(q(1+γ)2) =
1
(1 + γ)
qv(q(1+γ)2) ≤ CR(q) ≤ qv
(
q
(1 + γ)2
)
= (1+γ)2 CR
(
q
(1 + γ)2
)
.
If q(r) ≤ q, then the right inequality holds, and the left inequality becomes
1
(1 + γ)3
CR(q(1 + γ)3) = qv(q(1 + γ)2) ≤ CR(q).
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Proof. The upper bound on CR(q) follows from Lemma 6.3 in [6]. To prove the lower bound, we
choose j so that tj+1 =
2(j+1)−1
2m ≥ q ≥ 2j−12m = tj . As defined in [6], the values ti denote the
empirical quantiles of the samples. As stated in [6], tj(1 + γ) ≥ tj+1, for tj ≥ ξ. If q ≤ q(r), then
CR(q) ≥ CR(tj) ≥ tjv(tj(1 + γ)2) (by Lemma 6.3 in [6])
≥ q
(1 + γ)
v(q(1 + γ)2)
=
1
(1 + γ)3
CR(q(1 + γ)2).
Otherwise, if q ≥ q(r), then,
CR(q) ≥ CR(tj+1) ≥ tj+1v(tj+1(1 + γ)2) (by Lemma 6.3 in [6])
≥ qv(q(1 + γ)3)
=
1
(1 + γ)3
CR(q(1 + γ)3).
4.1 Revenue of the VCG-L Mechanism
We start with the VCG-L mechanism as defined in [8]. As described previously, the VCG-L
mechanism runs VCG but with lazy reserve prices. In particular, after running VCG, all bidders
who bid less than their reserve price are removed, and the remaining bidders are charged the
maximum of their reserve price and the VCG payment. When only given access to samples, we use
the empirical reserve price, rather than the actual reserve price.
By a simple application of Lemma 14, we obtain the following bound.
Theorem 6. The expected revenue of the empirical VCG-L mechanism with k classes of bidders
is at least an α1/(1−α) · 1−ξ(1+γ)2(1−kδ)(1+γ)4 fraction of the expected efficiency of the VCG mechanism,
given m ≥ 6(1+γ)γ2ξ max
{
ln 3
γ , ln
3
δ
}
samples from each class, with γξm ≥ 4 and (1 + γ)2 ≤ 32 .
Proof. We show that with probability 1 − kδ the empirical VCG-L mechanism achieves revenue
at least a 1−ξ(1+γ)
2
(1+γ)4
fraction of the VCG-L mechanism with total access to the distributions. The
statement of the theorem then follows from Theorem 2.
Assume that Eα holds for the samples from each distribution, which it does with probability
1 − kδ. For each bidder i, fix the valuations of all other bidders to be v−i, and let ti be bidder
i’s VCG threshold. Let ri be the reserve price for bidder i, and let ri be the empirical reserve
price. In each of the two mechanisms, bidder i is charged either its VCG threshold ti, or the
corresponding reserve price (ri in the original mechanism, and ri in the empirical mechanism.)
We show that in each of the four possible cases, the expected revenue from bidder i (over bidder
i’s possible valuations) in the empirical VCG-L mechanism is at least a 1−ξ(1+γ)
2
(1+γ)4 fraction of the
expected revenue from bidder i in the original VCG-L mechanism. Taking the expectation over
v−i and summing over all bidders proves the theorem.
Case 1: ri, ri ≤ ti.
Bidder i is charged the same amount in both mechanisms, and the expected revenue from bidder
i is also the same.
Case 2: ri, ri ≥ ti.
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Bidder i is charged ri in the VCG-L mechanism and is charged ri in the empirical VCG-L
mechanism. By Lemma 14, the expected revenue in the empirical VCG-L mechanism is at least a
1−ξ(1+γ)2
(1+γ)4 fraction of the expected revenue in the VCG-L mechanism.
Case 3: ri ≤ ti ≤ ri.
Bidder i is charged ti in the VCG-L mechanism and is charged ri in the empirical VCG-L
mechanism. By the convexity of the revenue curve, the expected revenue in the VCG-L mechanism
is less than CR(ri). It follows from Lemma 14 that the expected revenue from bidder i in the
empirical VCG-L mechanism is at least a 1−ξ(1+γ)
2
(1+γ)4 fraction of CR(ri).
Case 4: ri ≤ ti ≤ ri.
Bidder i is charged ri in the VCG-L mechanism and is charged ti in the empirical VCG-L
mechanism. By the convexity of the revenue curve, the expected revenue in the empirical VCG-L
mechanism is at least CR(ri). It follows from Lemma 14 that CR(ri) is at least a
1−ξ(1+γ)2
(1+γ)4 fraction
of the expected revenue in the VCG-L mechanism.
4.2 Single-item Auctions with Known Budgets
Consider the mechanism in Theorem 3, first given in [4]. Recall that this mechanism is actually
composed of two mechanisms, each chosen with probability one half. Mechanism 1 does not need
access to the distribution, while Mechanism 2 does, as one of its steps is to run Myerson’s mecha-
nism. The sample complexity of a suitably modified version of Myerson’s mechanism was already
studied in Theorem 6.9 in [6]. In particular with n bidders, the expected revenue in the sampling
setting is at least a (1− ǫ) fraction of the expected revenue with total access to the distribution, if
given m = Ω
((
n10
ǫ7
)
ln3 nǫ
)
samples. This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 7. The mechanism described in Theorem 3, when given access to m = Ω
((
n10
ǫ7
)
ln3 nǫ
)
samples per class of bidders, gives a 4α +2
α+1
α(2−α)/(1−α)(1−ǫ)(1−nδ)
-approximation to the social welfare
of a welfare-optimal budget-feasible mechanism.
4.3 Single-item Auctions with Private Budgets
We now consider the mechanism in Theorem 4, first given in [4]. Let (F,S,G) be the setting where
F is the set of distributions from which each bidder’s valuation is drawn, S is a matroid set system
of allowable sets, and G is the set of distributions from which each bidder’s budget is drawn. Let
B be the actual budgets. Then we define B as
B = argmaxS∈S
∑
i∈S
min{vi, Bi}
where v is the vector of bidder valuations. Finally, let Ti be the threshold for i’s inclusion in B,
Ti = min
{
v′ : i ∈ B for ((v−i, v′), (B−i, v′))
}
.
The proposed mechanism uses a lottery system which we define as follows.
Definition 2. A lottery system L(p, p′) either sets the price of an item at p if p ≥ p′/3, or allows
the bidder to choose a value a, 2p/p′ ≤ a ≤ 2/3, and then purchase an item at a price of ap′/2 with
probability 1/3 + a.
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The mechanism is to offer each bidder i the lottery system (Ti, ri), where ri is the reserve price
for bidder i.
When only given access to samples, we instead offer each bidder i the lottery system (Ti, ri),
where ri is the empirical reserve price based on m ≥ 6(1+γ)γ2ξ max
{
ln 3
γ , ln
3
δ
}
samples for some
0 < δ < 1 and γ satisfying γǫm ≥ 4 and (1 + γ)2 ≥ 3/2.
Let M be the optimal mechanism, and let ML be the proposed mechanism. Let RM∩B and
RM\B be the revenue that M obtains from serving those bidders in B and those not in B, respec-
tively. Additionally, let RML be the revenue from the proposed mechanism. The following lemma
relating RM\B and RML from [4] still holds even after modifying the lottery system offered to the
bidder.
Lemma 16. RM\B ≤ 3RML .
Before relating RM∩B andRML , we prove a sequence of lemmas. The first, a slight modification
of a claim in [6], upper bounds the revenue curve for quantiles less than q(r). This will allow us to
lower bound q(r).
Lemma 17. Let F be an α-SR distribution with reserve price r. For q ≤ q(r) and 0 < α < 1,
CR(q) ≤ CR(q(r)) 1
1 − α
((
q
q(r)
)α
− α q
q(r)
)
.
Proof. By letting q0 = r in Lemma 6.3 from [6] and using the fact that q(r)/f(r) = r, it follows
that
v(q) ≤ r + r
1− α
[(
q(r)
q
)1−α
− 1
]
.
Thus, CR(q) = q · v(q)
≤ qr + q r
1− α
[(
q(r)
q
)1−α
− 1
]
= CR(q(r))
q
q(r)
1 +
(
q(r)
q
)1−α
− 1
1− α

= CR(q(r))
1
1− α
((
q
q(r)
)α
− α q
q(r)
)
.
The following lemma lower bounds the quantile of the empirical reserve price in terms of the
quantile of the actual reserve price.
Lemma 18. Let 0 < α ≤ 1, and let F be an α-SR distribution. Then assuming that Eα holds for
the samples from each distribution,
q(r) ≥
(
1−
√
8γ
α
)
q(r).
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Proof. If q(r) ≥ q(r) the result holds trivially; so for the rest of the proof, we will assume that
r > r. To simplify the presentation, we let s =
√
8γ/α. Now assume for the sake of a contradiction
that the statement of the lemma does not hold i.e. that q(r) < (1 − s)q(r). We show that this
implies that CR(r) ≥ CR(r) which contradicts the choice of r.
By Lemma 13, CR(r) = q(r)r ≤ q(r)(1+γ)2r = CR(r)(1+γ)2. As r > r, and as by assumption
q(r) < (1− s)q(r),
CR(q(r))(1 + γ)2 < CR((1− s)q(r)) (1 + γ)2
≤ CR(q(r)) 1
1− α ((1− s)
α − α(1− s)) (1 + γ)2 (11)
(by Lemma 17).
The Taylor expansion of (1− s)α is ∑∞i=0 (−1)isiα(α−1)···(α−i+1)i! . It follows that (1− s)α ≤ 1−αs−
(1− α)αs2/2, as s < 1. Therefore (11) is bounded above by
CR(q(r))
1
1− α
(
1− α− (1− α)αs
2
2
)
(1 + γ)2 = CR(q(r))
(
1− αs
2
2
)
(1 + γ)2. (12)
On replacing s with
√
8γ/α in (12) this becomes
CR(q(r))(1 − 4γ)(1 + γ)2 ≤ 1
(1 + γ)2
CR(q(r)), as 1− 4γ ≤ 1/(1 + γ)4.
By Lemma 13 again, this is bounded above by CR(r), yielding CR(r) < CR(r), a contradiction.
Now we relate RM∩B and RML , following the proof of Lemma 13 in [4] very closely.
Lemma 19. With probability 1− kδ, where k is the number of bidders,
RM∩B ≤ 3
α1/(1−α)(1−max{
√
8γ/α, 4γ + ξγ})R
ML .
Proof. We assume that Eα holds for the samples from each distribution, which it does with prob-
ability 1 − kδ by a union bound. As in [4], fix a bidder i, along with (v−i,B) and consequently
Ti. Additionally, bidder i only contributes to RM∩B if vi ≥ Ti. We consider two cases, Ti ≥ r and
Ti ≤ r. The former case retains its proof in [4]. In particular,
Evi [RM∩Bi (v,B)|vi ≥ Ti] ≤ Evi [RM
L
i (v,B)|vi ≥ Ti], (13)
where RXi is the revenue from bidder i in mechanism X .
In the case Ti ≤ r, as in Lemma 13 in [4],
Evi [RM∩Bi (v,B)|vi ≥ Ti] ≤ min{r,Bi}. (14)
By Lemma 10 in [4], if vi ≥ r, then RMLi ≥ min{r,Bi}/3. This occurs with probability 1 − F (r),
and therefore
Evi [RM
L
i (v,B)|vi ≥ Ti] ≥ min{r,Bi}(1− F (r))/3.
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In the case that min{r,Bi} = r, by Lemma 14, the right-hand side is bounded below by
(1 − 4γ − ξ)(min{r,Bi})(1 − F (r))/3. In the case that min{r,Bi} = Bi, by Lemma 18, the right-
hand side is bounded below by Bi
(
1−
√
8γ
α
)
(1− F (r))/3. Therefore, in general
Evi [RM
L
i (v,B)|vi ≥ Ti]
≥ min
{(
1−
√
8γ
α
)
, (1− 4γ − ξ)
}
(min{r,Bi})(1 − F (r))/3
= (1−max{
√
8γ/α, 4γ + ξ})(min{r,Bi})(1 − F (r))/3.
By Lemma 11,
Evi [RM
L
i (v,B)|vi ≥ Ti] ≥ (1−max{
√
8γ/α, 4γ + ξ})(min{r,Bi})α1/(1−α)/3. (15)
Combining (14) and (15) gives
Evi [RM∩Bi (v,B)|vi ≥ Ti] ≤
3α−1/(1−α)(1−max{
√
8γ/α, 4γ + ξ})−1Evi [RM
L
i (v,B)|vi ≥ Ti].
We have just shown the above inequality in the case Ti ≤ r; but by (13) it also holds when
Ti ≥ r. Next, we note that when vi ≤ Ti, bidder i does not contribute to RM∩Bi , and consequently
the conditioning can be ignored. Taking the expectation over (v−i,B) and summing over all i
yields the lemma.
Combining Lemmas 16 and 19 yields the following theorem.
Theorem 8. The mechanism ML performed with k bidders obtains a total revenue that is a
3
1−kδ
(
1 + 1
α1/(1−α)(1−max{
√
8γ/α,4γ+ξγ})
)
-approximation to the revenue of the optimal mechanism,
given m ≥ 6(1+γ)γ2ξ max
{
ln 3
γ , ln
3
δ
}
samples per class of bidders when there are k classes, γξm ≥ 4
and (1 + γ)2 ≤ 32 .
4.4 Multi-item Auctions with Public Budgets
We now consider the mechanism in Theorem 5, first given in [3]. Here there is a set of bidders, a
set of items, and a different distribution for the valuations for each (bidder, item) pair. Each item
can be assigned to at most one bidder, each bidder can receive only a specified number of items,
and each bidder can spend no more than a pre-determined budget.
In addition, we add a point mass to the empirical distribution at q(ξ) so that v(q) and q(v) are
defined for all quantiles less than ξ and all values greater than v(ξ) respectively.
A key step in this mechanism is to solve the linear program LP2 below with coefficients derived
from the distribution. The optimal solution to LP2 yields a mechanism with the approximation
guarantee stated in Theorem 5. It is also the case that a feasible solution of LP2 achieving a
solution with value ρ ·OPT when substituted into a slight modification of the mechanism will yield
an approximation factor of ρ times the factor in Theorem 5. (See Figure 1; the original mechanism
had a probability of 1/4 in line 4; we use a smaller probability, p/4, which reduces the expected
revenue to p times its previous value.) As we only have access to samples of the distribution, we can
only create an approximate form of LP2, which we name LP3, described below. The main challenge
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is to show that a modification of an optimal solution to LP3 is feasible for LP2 and achieves a good
approximation to the optimum of LP2.
Notation: f and φ are the approximations to f and φ respectively, derived from the sample-
based empirical distribution. Additionally, I is the set of bidders, J is the set of items, Bi is the
budget of bider i, ni is the number of items bidder i can obtain, and Rij is the support of the
distribution Fij of the valuation of item j by bidder i. The virtual valuation function φij is derived
from Fij . Finally, xij(r) is the variable in the linear program corresponding to i ∈ I, j ∈ J and
r ∈ Rij.
Maximize
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)φij(r)xij(r)
Subject to: 1.
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)xij(r) ≤ ni ∀i ∈ I
2.
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)φij(r)xij(r) ≤ Bi ∀i ∈ I (LP2)
3.
∑
i∈I
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)xij(r) ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J
4. 0 ≤ xij(r) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, r ∈ Rij
Maximize
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
f ij(r)φij(r)xij(r)
Subject to 1.
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
f ij(r)xij(r) ≤ ni ∀i ∈ I
2.
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
f ij(r)φij(r)xij(r) ≤ Bi ∀i ∈ I (LP3)
3.
∑
i∈I
∑
r∈Rij
f ij(r)xij(r) ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J
4. 0 ≤ xij(r) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, r ∈ Rij
LP3 is obtained by replacing f by f , φ by φ, and x by x.
We will show that the optimal solution to LP3 is a good approximation to LP2. We start by
rewriting the above linear programs in a simpler format. Let x∗ij =
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)xij(r); by Lemma
3.13 in [3], the optimum of LP2 is achieved when for some L′, xij(r) = 0 for r < L
′, xij(r) = 1 for
r > L′, and 0 ≤ xij(L′) ≤ 1 where 1 ≤ L′ ≤ L. Also,
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)φij(r)xij(r) = CRij(x
∗
ij). We
can define x∗ij similarly; again
∑
r∈Rij
f ij(r)φij(r)xij(r) = CRij(x
∗
ij). These identities can be used
to rewrite LP2 in terms of x∗ij rather than xij(r) (shown below as LP2
′), and LP3 in terms of x∗ij
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(shown below as LP3′).
Maximize
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
CRij(x
∗
ij)
Subject to 1.
∑
j∈J
x∗ij ≤ ni ∀i ∈ I
2.
∑
j∈J
CRij(x
∗
ij) ≤ Bi ∀i ∈ I (LP2′)
3.
∑
i∈I
x∗ij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J
4. 0 ≤ x∗ij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J
Maximize
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
CRij(x
∗
ij)
Subject to 1.
∑
j∈J
x∗ij ≤ ni ∀i ∈ I
2.
∑
j∈J
CRij(x
∗
ij) ≤ Bi ∀i ∈ I (LP3′)
3.
∑
i∈I
x∗ij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J
4. 0 ≤ x∗ij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J
Finally, we note that in the optimal solution of both LP2 and LP3, x∗ij and x
∗
ij are no larger than
the reserve price quantiles of the distributions Fij and F ij respectively, for all i and j. To see this,
consider any x∗ij for which this is not the case. Because CRij is convex and CR(0) = CR(1) = 0,
there is another point y such that CR(x∗ij) = CR(y), but with y < q(r). Therefore, we can replace
x∗ij with y, without changing the value of the objective function and continuing to satisfy all the
constraints. This is the case for both x∗ij in LP2 and x
∗
ij in LP3.
As described in [3], the distributions Fij are truncated so that the support does not include
any value greater than Bi. Therefore CRij(q) ≤ Biq for all i and j, and quantiles q. This
bound also holds for CRij(q). To see this, let the point (q,CRij(q)) lie on the line segment from
(2k1−1m ,
2k1−1
m vk1) to (
2k2−1
m ,
2k2−1
m vk2). If vk1 = vk2 = Bi then CRij(q) = qBi, but if vk1 or vk2 were
any smaller, the value of CRij(q) would also be smaller.
We modify the mechanism given in [3]. In particular, we replace the step that solves LP2 with
a step to solve LP3 to obtain the solution x∗ij. We then construct z
∗
ij = max{x∗ij , ξ(1+γ)2}, and use
z∗ij in the mechanism. Additionally, instead of offering each item to each bidder with probability
1/4, we do so with probability (1− cξ)/(4(1 + γ)2) where c = max{|I|, |J |}(1 + γ)4.
Recall that, as proved in Lemma 3.13 in [3], v(z∗ij) can be written as w
∗
ijrij + (1−w∗ij)(rij +1)
where rij ∈ Rij and 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. Additionally, CR(z∗ij) = w∗ijCR(rij) + (1 − w∗ij)CR(rij + 1). The
rij and w
∗
ij will be used in the mechanism given below in Figure 1.
Consider the quantile q(v(z∗ij)). This is the ex-ante probability that bidder i’s valuation of item
j is at least r˜ij. By Lemma 3.13 in [3], r˜ij can be written as
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)q(v(z
∗
ij(r))). Note that
the original distribution is used, and not the empirical distribution. Then consider the variables
yij(r) defined as yij(r) =
1−cξ
(1+γ)2
q(v(z∗ij(r))) where c = max{|I|, |J |}(1 + γ)4. The following lemma
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1. Solve LP3, and let z∗ij be as defined in the text.
2. Process the bidders in term in some fixed, but arbitrary order.
3. For each (i, j) let r˜ij be rij with probability w
∗
ij and rij + 1 with probability 1− w∗ij, where
rij and w
∗
ij are as defined in the text.
4. For each (i, j) let Yij be a 0/1 random variable so that Yij = 1 with probability (1−cξ)/(4(1+
γ)2) and Yij = 0 otherwise.
5. Offer each bidder i all items j with Yij = 1 that have not already been bought, at price r˜ij.
Figure 1: Posted-Price Mechanism
shows that yij satisfies LP2. This will be used to show that the mechanism in Figure 1 satisfies the
allocation bounds with constant probability.
Lemma 20. The yij described above satisfy the constraints of LP2 with probability 1− |I|J |δ.
Proof. Assume that Eα holds for the samples from each distribution, which it does with probability
1− |I||J |δ. Consider the second constraint. By Lemma 13, as z∗ij ≥ ξ(1 + γ)2,
CRij(q(v(z
∗
ij))) = q(v(z
∗
ij))v(z
∗
ij) ≤ (1 + γ)2z∗ijv(z∗ij) = (1 + γ)2CRij(z∗ij). (16)
Additionally, if z∗ij = ξ(1+γ)
2, then CRij(z
∗
ij) ≤ Biξ(1+γ)2. Otherwise, z∗ij = x∗ij, and CRij(z∗ij) =
CRij(x
∗
ij). Therefore for each i,
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)φij(r)yij(r) =
1− cξ
(1 + γ)2
∑
j∈J
CRij(q(v(z
∗
ij)))
≤ (1− cξ)
∑
j∈J
CRij(z
∗
ij) (by (16))
≤ (1− cξ)
∑
j∈J
(
CRij(x
∗
ij) +Biξ(1 + γ)
2
)
≤ (1− |J |(1 + γ)4ξ)Bi + |J |Bi(1 + γ)2ξ
(as c ≥ |J |(1 + γ)4) and by Constraint 2 in LP3′)
≤ Bi
and the second constraint is satisfied.
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The proofs for the first and third constraints are similar. The first constraint holds, as
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)yij(r) =
1− cξ
(1 + γ)2
∑
j∈J
q(v(z∗ij))
≤ (1− cξ)
∑
j∈J
z∗ij (by Lemma 13 as z
∗
ij ≥ ξ is an empirical quantile)
≤ |J |(1 + γ)2ξ + (1− cξ)
∑
j∈J
x∗ij
≤ |J |(1 + γ)2ξ + (1− cξ)ni (by Constraint 1 in LP3′)
≤ |J |(1 + γ)2ξ + ni − |J |(1 + γ)4ξni
≤ ni.
The third constraint holds also, as
∑
i∈I
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)yij(r) =
1− cξ
(1 + γ)2
∑
i∈I
q(v(z∗ij))
≤ (1− cξ)
∑
i∈I
z∗ij (by Lemma 13)
≤ |I|(1 + γ)2ξ + (1− cξ)
∑
i∈I
x∗ij
≤ |I|(1 + γ)2ξ + (1− cξ) (by Constraint 3 in LP3′)
≤ |I|(1 + γ)2ξ + 1− |I|(1 + γ)4ξ
≤ 1.
We also show that the value of the optimization function of LP2 on the solution yij is close to
its value on the optimal solution x∗ij.
Lemma 21. Let yij be as described above, let x
∗
ij be the optimal solution of LP2, and define
V2 =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
CRij(x
∗
ij), and V3 =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)φij(r)yij(r).
Then with probability 1 − |I||J |δ, V3 ≥ (1−cξ)(1−c
′ξ)(1−ξ(1+γ)3)2
(1+γ)9
V2, where c = max{|I|, |J |}(1 + γ)4,
c′ = max{|I|, |J |}(1+γ)2, and each empirical distribution is determined bym ≥ 6(1+γ)γ2ξ max{ ln 3γ , ln 3δ }
samples, with γξm ≥ 4 and (1 + γ)2 ≤ 32 .
Proof. Assume that Eα holds for the samples from each distribution, which it does with probability
1−|I||J |δ. Consider the optimal assignment to LP2, x∗ij . We show that a slight modification to x∗ij
satisfies the conditions of LP3, and will use this to bound V3 from below. Let z
∗
ij = max{x∗ij , (1 +
γ)2ξ}/(1+ γ)2 if z∗ij ≤ q(r) and max{x∗ij , (1+ γ)3ξ}/(1+ γ)3 otherwise. For brevity, we write z∗ij =
max{x∗ij , (1 + γ)eijξ}/(1 + γ)eij , where eij = 2 or 3, as appropriate. By Lemma 3.13 in [3], we can
write z∗ij as z
∗
ij =
∑
r∈Rij
f ij(r)zij(r), and we let yij(r) =
1−c′ξ
(1+γ)2
zij(r) where c
′ = max{|I|, |J |}(1 +
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γ)2. We can show that yij satisfies the constraints of LP3 with an argument similar to that of
Lemma 20.
The first constraint holds, as
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
f ij(r)yij(r) =
1− c′ξ
(1 + γ)2
∑
j∈J
z∗ij
≤ 1
(1 + γ)4
∑
j∈J
(1 + γ)4ξ + (1− c′ξ)
∑
j∈J
x∗ij

≤ 1
(1 + γ)4
(|J |(1 + γ)4ξ + (1− c′ξ)(1 + γ)2ni) (by Constraint 1 in LP2′)
≤ ni.
The third constraint holds also, as
∑
i∈I
∑
r∈Rij
f ij(r)yij(r) =
1− c′ξ
(1 + γ)2
∑
i∈I
z∗ij
≤ 1
(1 + γ)4
(∑
i∈I
(1 + γ)4ξ + (1− c′ξ)
∑
i∈I
x∗ij
)
≤ 1
(1 + γ)4
(|I|(1 + γ)4ξ + (1− c′ξ)(1 + γ)2) (by Constraint 3 in LP2′)
≤ 1
(1 + γ)4
(|J |(1 + γ)4ξ + (1− |J |(1 + γ)2ξ)(1 + γ)2ni)
≤ 1
(1 + γ)4
(|I|(1 + γ)4ξ + (1− |I|(1 + γ)2ξ)(1 + γ)2)
≤ 1.
In order to show that the second constraint holds, we first need to show that CRij(z
∗
ij) is bounded
above by CRij(x
∗
ij)(1 + γ)
2 + Biξ. In the case that z
∗
ij = x
∗
ij/(1 + γ)
2, by Lemma 15, CRij(z
∗
ij)
is bounded above by (1 + γ)2 CRij(x
∗
ij/(1 + γ)
4). However, because q(rij) ≥ x∗ij ≥ x∗ij/(1 + γ)4,
CRij(x
∗
ij/(1 + γ)
4) ≤ CRij(x∗ij). If z∗ij = x∗ij/(1 + γ)3, then by Lemma 15, CRij(z∗ij) is bounded
above by (1+γ)2 CRij(x
∗
ij/(1+γ)
5) which is also bounded above by (1+γ)2 CRij(x
∗
ij). Otherwise,
if z∗ij = ξ then CRij(z
∗
ij) is bounded above by Biξ. Therefore, the second constraint holds, as for
every i,
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
f ij(r)φij(r)yij(r) =
1− c′ξ
(1 + γ)2
∑
j∈J
CRij(z
∗
ij)
≤ 1
(1 + γ)2
|J |Biξ + (1− c′ξ)∑
j∈J
CRij(x
∗
ij)(1 + γ)
2

≤ 1
(1 + γ)2
(|J |Biξ + (1− |J |(1 + γ)2ξ)Bi(1 + γ)2)
(by Constraint 2 in LP2′)
≤ Bi.
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We now bound V3 from below. Using the identity
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)φij(r)yij(r) =
1−cξ
(1+γ)2
CRij(q(v(z
∗
ij)))
and applying Lemma 13 to q(v(z∗ij)), it follows that
V3 =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
fij(r)φij(r)yij(r) =
1− cξ
(1 + γ)2
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
CRij(q(v(z
∗
ij)))
≥ 1− cξ
(1 + γ)4
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
CRij(z
∗
ij) (17)
We next compare CRij(z
∗
ij) to CRij(x
∗
ij). If z
∗
ij = x
∗
ij, then the two are equal. Otherwise, z
∗
ij =
ξ(1 + γ)2 and it follows from the convexity of CR that (1 − ξ(1 + γ)2)CRij(x∗ij) ≤ CRij(z∗ij).
Therefore, we can lower bound (17) and hence V3 by
V3 ≥ (1− cξ)(1− ξ(1 + γ)
2)
(1 + γ)4
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
CRij(x
∗
ij).
Because x∗ij is the optimal solution to LP3, it follows that∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
CRij(xij) ≥
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
f ij(r)φij(r)yij(r),
yielding a lower bound on V3 of
V3 ≥ (1− cξ)(1 − ξ(1 + γ)
2)
(1 + γ)4
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
∑
r∈Rij
f ij(r)φij(r)yij(r).
Using the identity
∑
r∈Rij
f ij(r)φij(r)yij(r) =
1−c′ξ
(1+γ)2
CRij(z
∗
ij), yields
V3 ≥ (1− cξ)(1− c
′ξ)(1− ξ(1 + γ)2)
(1 + γ)6
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
CRij(z
∗
ij).
We apply Lemma 15 to obtain a lower bound of
V3 ≥ (1− cξ)(1 − c
′ξ)(1− ξ(1 + γ)2)
(1 + γ)9
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
CRij(zij(r)(1 + γ)
eij ).
Similarly as before, because (1− ξ(1 + γ)3)CR(x∗ij) ≤ CR(z∗ij(1 + γ)eij ) we lower bound the above
by
V3 ≥ (1− cξ)(1− c
′ξ)(1 − ξ(1 + γ)2)(1 − ξ(1 + γ)3)
(1 + γ)9
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
CRij(x
∗
ij)
=
(1− cξ)(1− c′ξ)(1 − ξ(1 + γ)2)(1 − ξ(1 + γ)3)
(1 + γ)9
V2.
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Theorem 9. The empirical posted-price mechanism in Figure 1 gives an approximation to the
optimal truthful-in-expectation Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism with a multiplicative error
of
192
α
(
2− α
α
)1/(1−α) (1− cξ)(1− c′ξ)(1− ξ(1 + γ)3)2
(1 + γ)9
(1− |I||J |δ),
given m ≥ 6(1+γ)γ2ξ max{ ln 3γ , ln 3δ } samples from each distribution, if γξm ≥ 4 and (1 + γ)2 ≤ 32 .
Proof. Using the same proof as in Theorem 3.13 in [3], we can show that the mechanism in Figure
1 allocates item j to bidder i with probability 16 ·
y∗ij
4 . This follows from the fact that yij satisfies
the constraints of LP2, as stated in Lemma 20. By Lemma 21, the objective function of LP2 at yij
is close to the optimum V2, with probability 1− |I||J |δ.
Finally, 124V2, the revenue guaranteed by Theorem 5, is a
192
α
(
2−α
α
)1/(1−α)
approximation to
the revenue of the optimal mechanism. By the same analysis, the mechanism in Figure 1 yields
revenue 124V3, yielding the desired bound.
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